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PROPOSALS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REFORM: SIX DECADES OF INEPTITUDE AND
COUNTING
Douglas M. Branson*

I have a preference for taking the long view of matters, be they
corporate, white collar, or similar investigations,' or proposals to
shorten law school education. 2 So, too, I take the long-term view
with regard to proposals for corporate governance reform or
solutions for the separation of ownership and control which Adolf
Berle and Gardiner Means first espoused in 1932.3 My predilection
for the long view also stems from my authorship of the first legal
treatise on corporate governance in 19934 and my involvement in
governance of large corporations for over forty years.
Taking the long view, tracing the history of proposals for
improvement from 1932 to the present reveals support for several
propositions. One, the putative reformers seem to advance a
different proposal with clocklike regularity. When the previous
proposal evinces its character as a nonstarter, which happens
approximately every five years, the reformers, composed of a small
circle of academics, do an about-face. They begin to write prolifically
about an entirely new reform proposal which, talking to one
another, they concoct, usually out of whole cloth.
Two, all of these reform measures have, indeed, been
nonstarters. This Essay attempts to demonstrate that, insofar as it
can, the best evidence is the abandonment by the proposals' authors
* W. Edward Sell Chair in Law, University of Pittsburgh.
B.A.
University of Notre Dame; J.D. Northwestern University; L.L.M. University of
Virginia.
1. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Stepping Back from the Freeh Report:
Evolving Procedural Overkill?, JURIST (Aug. 31, 2013), http://jurist.org/forum
/2012/08/douglas-branson-freeh-report.php.
2. See Letter from Douglas M. Branson, Professor, Univ. of Pittsburgh, to
the Editor, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2013) (on file with the Wake Forest Law
Review) (pointing out that, in the long view, many universities that awarded a
law degree after 3 years undergraduate study and 2 years law study in the 30s,
40s, and 50s later eliminated such programs).
3. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1939).
4. See generally DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1993)
(with annual supplements).
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and other leading lights, who then move on to the next idea.
Advocates of the earlier reform proposal seem to abscond into the
darkness with more alacrity than a defaulting homeowner in a
jingle foreclosure. Thus, we have moved from the nationalization of
large enterprises and sectors of the economy (the 1950s and 1960s),
to social responsibility proposals (the early 1970s), to advocacy of
federal chartering or of federal minimum standards for large
corporations (the late 1970s). From there, in the early 1980s, we
moved onward to agency cost theory and the law and economics
movement (positing that the separation of ownership and control
represented rational apathy and was efficient rather than a
problem). 5 The radical leap from left to right, that is from federal
chartering to economic analysis, overlapped and competed with the
American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, which
emphasized structure and formulistic statements of first principles
(the mid-to late 1980s).6
In the 1990s, in metronome-like succession, proposals marched
forth for institutional investor activism, for globalization of
corporate governance, for regulation of gatekeepers, and for a
rediscovered emphasis on independent (non-executive) directors. At
last, corporate governance reform came to pass and led to
These reform
movements for renewed shareholder activism.
proposals sallied forth much like soldiers marching onto a parade
ground, at an intermediate distance, one from another.
Three, and perhaps most important, is the question, "Why is
this so?," an inquiry left for consideration at the end of this
jeremiad.
So this Essay. begins with a scroll through time, starting with
Berle and Means's 1932 postulate, and ending with Harvard
University Professor Lucian Bebchuk's Shareholder Rights Project
in 2013.7
5. "The separation of ownership and control is ... a false issue.
Separation is efficient, and indeed inescapable, given that for most shareholders
the opportunity costs of active participation in the management of the firm
would be prohibitively high." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
180 (1973).
6. The American Law Institute ("ALI") Corporate Governance Project
concluded on May 13, 1992. The ALI published the final work product in two
volumes in 1994. See generally 1-2 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994).
7. "The SRP works on behalf of public pension funds and charitable
organizations seeking to improve corporate governance at publicly traded
companies in which they are shareholders, as well as on research and policy
projects related to corporate governance." ShareholderRights Project, HARV. L.
(last
http://www.law.harvard.edulacademics/clinical/clinics/srp.html
SCH.,
visited September 17, 2013). So far the SRP represents eight institutional
investors (seven public employee pension funds and one foundation). The SRP
has concentrated on shareholder initiatives to declassify boards of directors
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I. THE BERLE AND MEANS THESIS
Prior to the teens and the twenties, most of the great
manufacturing and mercantile entities were privately held. Only
the railroads and the canal companies floated shares to the public.
Thus, the corporation and the publicly held corporation, along with
stock trading and the extensive public ownership that went with it,
Not
did not become widespread until after World War I.8
surprisingly then, the first thoughtful and comprehensive study of
the new corporate form did not emerge until 1932. What is
surprising, though, is that this study by two Columbia University
professors, one of law and the other of business, has remained the
seminal work for eighty years.
Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means documented the widespread
dispersion of corporate shareholders and the atomization of
corporate shareholdings. They noted that in the then-modern
corporation "ownership has become depersonalized." 9 The result
was that a new form of property came into being. The person who
owned the property no longer controlled it, whereas the farmer who
owned the horse had to feed it, teach it to pull the plow, and bury it
when it died. "[I]n the corporate system, the 'owner' of industrial
wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership while the power, the
responsibility and the substance which have been an integral part of
ownership in the past are being transferred to a separate group in
whose hands lies control."10 This was the fabled "separation of
ownership and control.""1
The next question Berle and Means asked themselves was
"What has moved into the vacuum created by this separation?" The
answer was self-perpetuating boards of directors, hand-picked by
self-perpetuating and oft-times greedy managers, who disregarded
the wants of shareholders and consumers alike.

a
powerful
boards,
which
represent
(like eliminating
staggered
About, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT,
deterrent to takeover bids).
http://srp.law.harvard.edulindex.shtml (last visited September 14, 2013). In
2011 and 2012, the SRP submitted 121 proposals to companies, of which "91
companies-about three quarters of those engaged-agreed to move toward
annual elections." Lucian Bebchuk, Wachtell Lipton Was Wrong About the
ShareholderRights Project, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(April 9, 2013, 8:51 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2013/04/09
/wachtell-lipton-was-wrong-about-the-shareholder-rights-project/.
8. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 47 (demonstrating that the
number of publically held stock increased dramatically following WWI). The
number of public shareholders was basically flat from 1913 to 1917 (7.4 million
to 8.6 million) but then accelerated (to 18 million) by 1928. Id. at 56 tbl.VIII.
9. Id. at 352.
10. Id. at 68.
11. Id. at 69-71, 90.
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The ensuing years have seen seemingly endless debate about
what is the solution to the Berle and Means problem, with one
lengthy hiatus (the economic analysis of law era) in which scholars
questioned whether the separation of ownership and control was a
problem at all. For the most part, though, corporate governance
reform efforts have opined as to what would render unaccountable
managers, no longer answerable to rank-and-file shareholders,
accountable. Would nationalization, installation of public interest
directors, mandatory social accounting and disclosure, federal
chartering of larger public corporations, market forces (including the
market for corporate control), activism by institutional investors,
the forces of globalization, or reinforced powers for gatekeepers, to
name a few, align managers' interests with those of owners and
other constituencies?
II. EARLY STIRRINGS ON THE REFORM FRONT

A deep depression, followed by a world war, forestalled
implementation of any belief that regulation or legislation could
check the power of large corporations and their managements. But
after the War, governments became concerned over the might of
large industrial complexes, especially in key industries. Great
Britain nationalized the coal industry as well as the Bank of
England in 1947,12 followed by the nationalization of electric
generating in 1948.13 Nationalization of the steel industry and of
the railroads followed those opening salvos. 14 The government
controlled those and other key sectors of the British economy until it
privatized them again, primarily in the 1980s. 15
III. BEGINNING OF ECONOMISTs' RESPONSES TO THE PERCEIVED
PREPARATION

Paul Krugman, an economist of our times, has termed John

Kenneth Galbraith, an economist from the 1950s through the 1970s,
"a policy entrepreneur" and a "media personality" whose works
proved Galbraith to be "remarkably ill-informed."1 6 But wide
segments of the public read Galbraith's books and considered him

12. See e.g., WILLIAM WARREN HAYNES, NATIONALIZATION IN PRACTICE: THE
BRITISH COAL INDUSTRY (1953).
13. John Biscoe, History of Public Supply in the UK, ENGINEERING
TIMELINES,
http://www.engineering-timelines.com/how/electricity/electricity
_07.asp (last visited September 17, 2013).
14. See generally GEORGE W. Ross, THE NATIONALIZATION OF STEEL: ONE
STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK? (1965).
15. See ARTHUR MARWICK, BRITISH SOCIETY SINCE 1945, at 407 tbl.11 (3d ed.
1996) (listing privatizations by year).
16. PAUL KRUGMAN, PEDDLING PROSPERITY: EcoNOMIC SENSE AND NONSENSE
IN THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS 12-14 (1994).
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not only to be an economist but by far the most influential economist
of his day.
In one of his best known books, American Capitalism: The
Concept of Countervailing Power,'7 Galbraith rhetorically posed a
number of solutions to the problem of unchecked corporate power,
including the separation of ownership and control, although he
generally did not use the Berle and Means terminology.' 8 He did
not propose nationalization, as the British had done. Instead, he
theorized that, indeed, corporations had grown too large. Their
shareholders no longer controlled them, competitive market forces
no longer constrained them, and the potential for abuse was great.19
That potential would be checked, however, by the growth of
countervailing power inherent in the growth of labor unions,
consumer groups, and government agencies. 20 Galbraith pointed to
the growth and influence of consumer cooperatives, which enjoyed
great growth in Scandinavia, at least in the post-War years. 2 1
Essentially, those newly empowered groups would supply the
controls that, historically, owners had provided.
Later, Professor Galbraith confessed error. Consumer groups
never achieved anything like the promise which the post-War
experiences in Norway and Sweden had presaged. Once their
members had garnered collective bargaining rights and achieved a
certain level of wages and benefits, labor unions and their members
came to empathize with and even share many of the goals and
methods of corporate managements. 22
In the New Industrial State, Galbraith admitted that the
concept of countervailing power was not the answer, in part because
the power did not always exist and in part because forces did not
work in the ways he had envisioned. But not to worry. The power of
management was much more limited than he had previously
thought. Instead, power resided in the "Technostructure," that
group of technicians, scientists, engineers, and middle managers
within large enterprises who, by their actions, control the company

17. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER (rev. ed. 1956).

18. See, e.g., id. at 24 (discussing the problem of power).

19. See id. at 114-15.
20. See id. at 114 ("The operation of countervailing power is to be seen with
the greatest clarity in the labor market where it is also the most fully
developed."); id. at 117 ("The labor market serves admirably to illustrate the
incentives to the development of countervailing power .... ).
21. Id. at 126-27 (discussing the Swedish Kooperative Forbundet).
22. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDusTRIAL STATE 274-81 (3d ed.,
rev. 1978); see also JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 332
(1985) [hereinafter GALBRAITH (1985) ("The natural tendency of man ... is
almost certainly to work until a given consumption is achieved. Then he
relaxes . . . .").
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and influence the economy. 2 3 Most members of that group shared
the values with and had objectives similar to other citizens in the
communities in which they lived and worked.
Galbraith ultimately gave up the notion of the Technostructure
and the way it was supposed to fill the vacuum the separation of
ownership and control created. Looking back on the ideas he had
espoused in Economics and the Public Purpose,24 Galbraith not only
confessed error, but threw in the towel. He confessed that maybe
the only workable solution to the accumulation and abuses of
unchecked power in modern corporations was some form of central
planning, akin to what the British had done in the late 1940s. 25 In
the meanwhile, he had become the U.S. Ambassador to India, and
his writing turned to other subjects. 26
IV. THE CORPORATE SocIAL RESPONSIBILITY MOVEMENT OF THE
EARLY 1970S
Earth Day on April 22, 1970, marked a sudden awakening in
the American consciousness, with all night teach-ins and extensive
hand-wringing over the effects of too many phosphates from
detergents in our streams, smoke and other particulates in our air
from factory smokestacks, and the rapacious unchecked quest for
sales and profits that corporations pursued. 27 The calls for reform
that ensued coincided with the peak of dissatisfaction with the
Vietnam War. 2 8 "Respect for authority, or for one's elders, had not
completely disappeared but everybody (young that is) seemed prone

23. See, e.g., GALBRAITH (1985), supra note 22, at 84 ("Effective power of
decision is lodged deeply down in the technical, planning and other specialized
staff."); id. at 87-88 ("This latter group is very large.... It embraces all who
bring specialized knowledge, talent or experience to group decision-making....
I propose to call this organization the Technostructure.").
24.

See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC

PURPOSE (1973) (discussing the problems of our modern consumer economy and
the need to realign with the public interest).
25. Id. at 322 ("The only remedy is the coordination of planning
[P]lanning systems . . . also require a measure of international
policies ....
planning.").
26. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMBASSADOR'S JOURNAL: A PERSONAL
ACCOUNT OF THE KENNEDY YEARS 45 (1969) (confirmation hearing before U.S.
Senate on March 24, 1961).
27. See, e.g., MARC MOWREY & TIM REDMOND, NOT IN OUR BACKYARD: THE
PEOPLE

AND

EVENTS

THAT

SHAPED

AMERICA'S

MODERN

ENVIRONMENTAL

MOVEMENT 13 (1993) ("Earth Day was a stunning event, the largest
demonstration in the nation's history. Its size and scope dwarfed the largest of
the Vietnam War protests. . . ."); see also id. at 39-43.
28. But see id. at 39 ("[T]he only major political figure who wasn't going to
celebrate Earth Day was the president, Richard Nixon .... ).
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to question assumptions and long-held beliefs, about everything,"29
including the role of corporations in our society.
The social responsibility movement called for government
intervention, as the nationalization movement had, but on discrete
fronts rather than on a plenary basis.
One scholar urged
replacement of the one share, one vote standard prevalent in U.S.
corporate law with a graduated scale so that with the acquisition of
additional shares, owners, particularly institutional owners who
were perceived to be excessively mercenary, would receive less and
less voting power. 30 A "power to the people" mandate would
augment the power of individual owners, who generally held fewer
shares but were thought to be more socially conscious. 31
Calls for required installation of public interest directors on
publicly
held
corporations'
boards
sometimes
included
subrecommendations that legislation also require that the public
interest directors be equipped with offices and staffs at corporate
expense. 32 Others proposed requirements for social auditing and for
mandatory disclosure of social audit results. 33 A law professor at
Georgetown University led his students in the submission of public
interest proxy proposals at General Motors Co. for three successive
years. 34 Based on the experience, the professor advocated for the
liberalization of the SEC shareholder proxy proposal rule. 35
Previously, however, critics had pointed out that public interest
directors had been mandated for the boards of Communications
Satellite Corporation ("Comsat") and the reorganized Union Pacific
railroad. The Union Pacific public interest directors complained
29. DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, THREE TASTES OF Nuoc MAM: THE BROWN WATER
NAVY AND VISITS TO VIETNAM 88 (2012).

30. See David Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical
Reflections on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12-13,
32, 45 (1970) (arguing that the German system might be more "palatable" if the
United States were to change its approach).
31. Id. at 45.
32. See, e.g., Remarks of Professor Alfred Conard in Symposium, The

CorporateMachinery for Hearing and Heeding New Voices, 27 Bus. LAW. 195,
197, 200 (1971) ("Let us now consider the appointment of representatives of
labor, or of consumers, or of some group of cohabitants on the board of
directors . . . ."); see also Norton Long, The Corporation,Its Satellites and the
Local Community, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 202 (Edward
Mason ed., 1960).

33. Douglas M. Branson, Progressin the Art of Social Accounting and Other
Arguments for Disclosure on CorporateSocial Responsibility, 29 VAND. L. REV.
539, 543 (1976).

34. See, e.g., Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest:
Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1971); Donald E. Schwartz,

Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-Existence with Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 57
(1971).

35. See Donald E.

Schwartz, Proxy Power and Social Goals-How

Campaign GM Succeeded, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 764, 770-71 (1971).
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that not only were they given little information but that they were
"treated as spies and antagonists . .. kept in the dark about many

things."36 While resigning from the eight boards of directors upon
which he served, retired Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg
stressed that even independent directors cannot do an adequate job,
at least without independent staffs and plenary access to
information. 37 The implication for so-called public interest directors
was clear.
Advocacy for weighted voting scheme ideas and expanded public
interest proxy proposals never seemed to catch fire. The corporate
social auditing and disclosure proposal went nowhere as well,
although several decades later legal scholars purported to plow new
ground by essentially dusting off and advocating the same ideas. 38
V. MEGA-REFORM PROPOSALS: FEDERAL CHARTERING AND FEDERAL
MINIMUM STANDARDS

Toward the second half of the 1970s, while discrete reforms
such as social auditing and expanded public interest proxy proposal
faded from view, two more drastic reform proposals moved onto and
occupied center stage. These proposals eclipsed completely the
corporate governance reform proposals of the social responsibility
movement. Former SEC Chairman and Columbia University law
professor William Cary proposed the least drastic reform. He
envisioned federal legislation that would trump state corporate law
on key points should state law standards prove to be too lax or promanagement. 39 Thus, Congress would enact minimum standards on
such subjects as interested director transactions, usurpation of
corporate opportunities, directors' standard of care, the fiduciary
duty of controlling shareholders, and so on.4 0
The Corporate Accountability Research Group, created and
promoted by consumer advocate Ralph Nader, gathered evidence,
marshaled arguments, and advocated the other, more drastic reform
of the 1970s: federal chartering of large corporations. 41 In certain

36. Herman Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed Directors in a Private
Corporation-The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HARv. L. REV. 350,
359 (1965).
37. See Directors: The Goldberg Variation, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1972, at 88
(discussing Goldberg's resignation from Trans World Airline).
38. See, e.g., Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure
Requirements?, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1433 (2002); Cynthia A. Williams, The
Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112
HARv. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
39. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware,83 YALE L.J. 663, 701-02 (1974).
40. Id. at 702.
41. The academic-like work was RALPH NADER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALIZING
THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT
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incarnations, chartering advocates expanded the proposal's reach,
from the five hundred largest enterprises to the two thousand
largest U.S. corporations by revenue, to any corporation that did a
significant amount of business with the federal government, and
then to certain categories of companies whose businesses were
thought to be infected with the public interest. 42
Whatever the universe of such corporations, these companies
would have to reregister with a new federal entity, the Federal
Chartering Agency. 4 3 In addition, these corporations would no
longer have perpetual existence as they had under state law.
Instead, the new federal statute corporations would have only
limited life charters, good for a limited twenty or twenty-five years.
The federal statute would direct the Federal Chartering Agency
to condition the grant of the original charter and all renewals upon
compliance with federal anti-concentration standards that the new
legislation would contain. In addition, the Agency would condition
the issuance of a charter upon compliance with all applicable federal
laws: transportation safety, occupational health and safety,
securities, consumer statutes, environmental standards for clean air
and clean water, and so on. 44
Intrusive as it may have been, federal chartering of corporation
gained traction, possibly because of the star power of its chief
advocate, Ralph Nader. Chaired by Senator Howard Metzenbaum,
the Senate Commerce Committee held hearings on the federal
chartering proposal, not once, not twice, but in three successive
congresses. 45

CORPORATIONS (1976). The Nader group also published a popular press version,
RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976).

42. See, e.g., Joel F. Henning, Federal Corporate Chartering for Big
Business: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 915, 922 (1972)
("[It becomes necessary to require] a national franchise ... of a smaller
corporation if it wishes to do a significant amount of business with the federal
government, to operate subsidiaries or factories in foreign countries, or to
engage in certain industries where there is an overriding federal interest, such
as energy . . . .").

43. See Ralph Nadar, How to Tame the Corporation,HUFFPosT Bus. (Feb.
25, 2013, 12:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ralph-nader/corporate
-charters b_2759596.html (arguing that the next step is for a Federal Charter).
44. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 4, at 659-62 (summarizing the federal
chartering proposal).

45. See generally Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban
Affairs, 96th Cong. (1980); The Role of the Shareholder in the Corporate World:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens & S'holder Rights & Remedies of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1977); Corporate Rights and
Responsibilities:HearingsBefore the S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. (1976).
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VI. A SEISMIC SHIFT: THE SwiFT RISE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
JURISPRUDENCE

Perhaps only once in a lifetime will one see as pronounced a
jurisprudential shift as that from the corporate social responsibility
and federal chartering movements to the minimalist, noninvasive
law and economics take on corporate law and corporate governance.
Judge Richard Posner's groundbreaking treatise appeared in 1973.46
In the corporate field and in many other areas, however, Dean
Henry Manne was the father of the law and economics movement. 47
Corporate law scholars harked back to his work, The Market for
Corporate Control, which appeared in 1965,48 as well as to other
seminal articles Dean Manne wrote earlier in his career. 49
Law and economics pointed to a minimalist corporate
jurisprudence. The core theory was that market forces regulated
corporate and managerial behavior much better than regulation,
laws, or lawsuits ever could. Specifically, law and economics
adherents pointed to the product market and a corporation's success
or failure in it as a superior form of regulation for corporations.5 0
Adherents also found superior as a regulator the market for
corporate control in which, as a result of a falling share price, a
corporation might find itself to be a takeover target. A bidder might
succeed with a tender offer or takeover bid, ousting
underperforming managers and moving the target corporation in a
different direction.
A subgroup of law and economics adherents became zealots,
actively proselytizing that corporate law had no role other than to
provide an off-the-rack contract approximating the contractual
bargain the parties would have struck on their own had no
transaction costs existed. These "contractarians" preached that
each and every aspect of corporate law, including fiduciary duties,

46. POSNER, supranote 5.

47. See, e.g., Symposium, The Legacy of Henry G. Manne-Pioneerin Law
& Economics and Innovator in Legal Education, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203
(1999).

48. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.
POL. EcoN. 110 (1965); see, e.g., William J. Carney, The Legacy of "The Market
for Corporate Control" and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 215 (1999); Fred S. McChesney, Manne, Mergers, and the Market
for Corporate Control, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 245 (1999).

49. A second seminal piece was Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967).
50. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5, at 183 ("[T]wo forces .. . operate to keep
managers in line. One is competition in the market for the firm's product,
which penalizes mismanagement.

corporate control.").

The other is competition in the market for
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could be contractually negated. 51 Corporate law should have no
mandatory content: by contract, participants in a venture could opt
out of any regulatory provision they wished. Corporate law's rules
only function was to provide "default rules." 5 2
VII. AN ANTIDOTE: THE GOOD GOVERNANCE MOVEMENT

At Airlie House in Northern Virginia in 1975 the germ of an
idea began to sprout. What issued forth was the idea that the
prestigious American Law Institute ("ALI"), author of the wellknown restatements of the law, would undertake a restatement of
corporate law, large portions of which traditionally had been left to
judge-made law rather than to statutory codifications. In "black
letter," with extensive commentary and reporters' notes, the ALI
would attempt to distill the better of the common law rules,
incorporating an incremental improvement here and there. Several
subsequent symposia seconded and fine-tuned the proposal.
The ALI named Professor Stanley Kaplan of the University of
Chicago Chief Reporter. 53 Under his guidance, assistant reporters
assembled the first tentative draft upon which ALI members
The early drafts
deliberated in their 1982 annual meeting.
emphasized independent directors and a minimum-director
committee structure with audit, nominating, and compensation
The boards of directors of large publicly held
committees.5 4
companies should have a majority of independent directors, that is,
directors free of financial or other ties to the corporation and its
senior managers. Smaller public companies should have, as a
minimum, three independent directors.
The early ALI drafts ignited a furor. The Business Roundtable,
comprised of the CEOs of the largest one hundred U.S. corporations,
formed a study group whose main objective was to oppose the ALI.66

51. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to
Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to CorporateDirectors, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 376 (1988).
52. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 22-25, 90-94 (1991).
53. The author is a Life Member of the American Law Institute and has
been a member since 1980. He had a personal relationship with the late
Professor Stan Kaplan of the University of Chicago. The material in this
section of the article relies heavily on the author's active participation in the
ALI Corporate Governance Project.
54. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE:
RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1 (1982).
55. See, e.g., EDMUND T. PRATT, JR., THE ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PROJECT: A RADICAL CURE FOR A HEALTHY PATIENT (1989). The Roundtable

titled its study group with the official-sounding name "The National Legal
Center." Pratt was the Chairman of the Business Roundtable and the Chief
Executive Officer of Pfizer, Inc.
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The Roundtable accused the ALI of initiating a movement of
corporate governance by litigation.5 6 Large firm corporate lawyers
and in-house counsel of major corporations joined the ALI in droves.
The ALI annual meeting morphed from a somnambulant affair, in
which a reporter would review the black letter provisions of the
Restatement of Trusts to a score or two of dozing ALI members, into
a beyond-lively scene. In-house counsel packed the meeting in
droves. Not a single seat remained vacant in the ballroom of the
Mayflower Hotel in Washington where the ALI conducted most
meetings. Overflow participants sat in the aisles and on the steps at
the rear of the room. Television film crews interviewed key players
in the wide corridor outside the ballroom.
Blowing past the maxim that in law reform a lawyer leaves her
client at the door, in-house counsel openly hawked self-serving
positions. They insisted that a body such as the ALI had no
business attempting to dictate how large corporations should
structure their boards of directors.
Vilified, and after receiving thinly veiled threats, Stan Kaplan
resigned as chief reporter and was replaced by Professor Melvin
Eisenberg of the University of California at Berkeley. Under
pressure, the ALI removed Restatement from the enterprise's title,
renaming the project Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis
and Recommendations.67 Those were heady and exciting times, at
least in the corporate law world.
After those turbulent years, in the latter 1980s, the ALI Project
settled into a pattern of yearly tentative drafts that the house then
debated at annual meetings held once in Chicago, once in San
Francisco, and otherwise at the aforesaid Mayflower Hotel in
Washington D.C. The house approved the final product at its 1992
annual meeting. The ALI Corporate Governance Project appeared
in print in two bound volumes in 1994.58
The ALI Corporate Governance Project constituted an implicit
rejection of and an antidote to the law and economics movement.
Succinctly, the ALI evinced a strong belief that, yes, corporate law
does have a role to play. That belief, sometimes characterized as the
constitutionalist approach, in contrast to the contractarian
approach, underlines and buttresses the entire ALI Project.
The ALI crafted recommended rules for corporate objectives:
structure, including board composition and committee structure;
duty of "fair dealing" (duty of loyalty); duty of care and the business
56. See DONALD V. SEIBERT, THE ALI AND ITS "LITIGATION MODEL" OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1989). Donald Seibert was the Former Chairman of
J.C. Penny Co., Inc.
57. See 1 AM. LAW INST., supra note 6.
58. 1 AM. LAW INST., supra note 6 (totaling 432 pages); 2 AM. LAW INST.,
supra note 6 (totaling 477 pages).
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judgment rule; roles of directors and shareholders in control
transactions and tender offers; and shareholders' remedies,
including the derivative action and appraisal remedies. Discrete
fair dealing provisions dealt with such subjects as interested
directors' transactions, definitions of which opportunities are
corporate opportunities, competition with the corporation by officers
and directors, compensation of corporate officials, and the like.
On one level, the ALI Corporate Governance Project has had
mixed success. The high courts of several states have expressly
adopted the ALI's business judgment rule as a safe harbor rather
than the Delaware business judgment rule as a presumption.5 9
Given the glacial pace at which corporate law evolves, at least in
states other than Delaware, several states' adoption constitutes a
win for the ALI. Several other states have followed the ALI
approach in defining which opportunities are corporate
opportunities, layering several tests one upon the other rather than
adopting a single rule or test.
Indeed, one can argue that
Delaware's leading case, Broz v. Cellular Information Systems,
Inc.,6 0 mimics the ALI approach. By contrast, only one state,
Pennsylvania, has adopted the ALI approach to derivative actions
and corporate boards potential treatment of them.6 1 Among those
states which have decisions on point, most follow the highly
deferential, pro-management approach of the New York Court of
Appeals in Auerback v. Bennett,62 or the only slightly less deferential
Delaware decision in Zapata Corporationv. Maldonado.6 3
On a deeper level, though, the ALI has been a very successful
precedent for at least three reasons. First, the ALI Project
recommendations for board composition and governance through
committee structures have become the standard all major
corporations follow and, indeed, exceed. At first controversial and
extreme, those norms are "old hat" by now. Second, the ALI Project
was the first comprehensive corporate governance blueprint, giving
inspiration to a host of governance blueprints which have followed,
including the Cadbury Code, the OECD Code, Richard Breeden's
"Points of Light," and many more. 64 Third, and most importantly,
59. See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Conn.
1994); Omnibank v. United S. Bank, 607 So. 2d 76, 85 (Miss. 1992); Seidman v.
Clifton Say. Bank SLA, 14 A.3d 36, 52-53 (N.J. 2011).
60. 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996).
61. See Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1049 (Pa. 1997) ("We
specifically adopt §§7.02-7.10, and §7.13 of the ALI Principles.").
62. 393 N.E.2d 994, 994 (N.Y. 1979).
63. 430 A.2d 779, 779 (Del. 1981); see generally ARTHUR R. PINTO &
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 488-99 (3d ed. 2009).
64. See, e.g., The Cadbury Report, ICAEW: LIBRARY & INFO. SERV.,
http://www.icaew.comlen/library/subject-gateways/corporate-governance/codesand-reports/cadbury-report (last visited September 17, 2013); Corporate
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the ALI Project represented an alternative to the law and economics
movement, striving for ascendancy at the time, pontificating that
law had little or no role to play in the governance of corporations.
The ALI Project itself is a strong statement that law does have such
a role. The ALI Project then goes on for 909 pages, in great detail
describing what that role should be. 6 5
VIII. THE EARLY 1990s: THE EMPHASIS ON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
ACTIVISM
Most individual investors practice what has been termed
"rational apathy." Thus, often individual shareholders do not read
annual proxy statements that, under traditional SEC rules, public
corporations must publish and distribute.66 Indeed, if they do invest
directly in corporate shares, rather than indirectly through mutual
funds or exchange-traded funds ("ETFs"), many individual
shareholders do not even vote the shares they own. In contrast,
institutional investors have fiduciary duties that require them to
read and analyze proxy statements and to vote the shares they
hold.67 Many institutions hire independent consultants such as
Glass Lewis or Risk Metrics to make recommendations on how those
institutions should vote shares they own.
Traditionally, though, institutional investors followed the "Wall
Street Rule," meaning that if they developed an aversion to a
portfolio company's performance or governance, they simply sold the
stock rather than become embroiled in a corporate governance issue.
Institutions voted with their feet. That is, they did so until portfolio
positions had become so large that if an institutional investor
liquidated even a sizeable portion of the portfolio's stake in a
company, the institution's sales alone would push down the stock's
price. Thus, in the modern era, institutional investors are faced

Institute, POINTS OF LIGHT, http://www.pointsoflight.org/corporate-institute (last
visited September 17, 2013); OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2004),
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/calcorporategovernanceprinciples

/31557724.pdf.
65. 1 AM. LAW INST., supra note 6 (totaling 432 pages); 2 AM. LAW INST.,
supra note 6 (totaling 477 pages).
66. In 2007, the SEC began rollout of its "Notice Equals Access" initiative,
which incorporates an "access equals delivery" theory and which relieves
corporations from the affirmative obligation to send out proxy statements and
annual reports. Corporations may now send shareholders a thin envelope
directing them to telephone numbers and Internet portals through which they
may obtain written documents if they want them.
See, e.g., Internet
Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55146, 89 S.E.C.
Docket 2489 (Jan. 22, 2007); see PINTo & BRANSON, supra note 63, at 185-86.
67. PHILIP STILES & BERNARD TAYLOR, BOARDS AT WORK: How DIRECTORS
VIEW THEIR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 88 (2001).
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with more of a buy-and-hold strategy than they otherwise might
prefer.
So was born an opening to push for yet another proposed reform
that would fill the vacuum created by the separation of ownership
and control, namely, institutional activism, or "agents watching
agents."6 8 The case for institutional oversight was that because
"product, capital, labor, and corporate market control constraints on
managerial discretion are imperfect, corporate managers need to be
watched by someone, and the institutions are the only watchers
available." 69 From a comparative viewpoint, "financial institutions
are active monitors in other countries, notably Germany and Japan.
This suggests they could play a similar role here."7 0
The gainsayers, from elite academic institutions similar to the
leading proponent, debated this theoretical proposal, at least until
the same academics moved on to another set of proposals in the next
half decade.
One critic opined that, second to investment
performance, institutional investors' primary concern was liquidity,
which would militate strongly against a strategy of buy, hold, and
try to influence the course of events though share voting. 71 The
leading critic pointed out that a vogue prevalent among a large
group of institutional money managers was "indexing," which
translated into assembling a portfolio of stocks whose performance
would match the performance of a broad stock market index, no
more, no less. 7 2 Such an indexing strategy was the antithesis of
purchasing individual stocks to be followed by a pattern of
attempting to influence events at particular portfolio companies
through share voting and efforts at persuasion.7 3
This critic (Professor Ed Rock at the University of
Pennsylvania) further observed that corporate pension trusts, whose
trustees' appointments are controlled by corporate sponsors,
managers, and directors, would have near zero interest in an
institutional investor strategy of activism. 74 Then, among the likely

68. "[I]institutional voice means asking one set of agents (money managers)
to watch another set of agents (corporate managers)." Bernard S. Black, Agents
Watching Agents: The Promise of InstitutionalInvestor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV.
811, 817 (1992) [hereinafter Agents Watching Agents]; see also id. at 887 ("We
will be asking one set of agents to watch another set of agents."); see generally
Bernard S. Black, The Value of InstitutionalInvestor Monitoring: The Empirical
Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 (1992).
69. Agents Watching Agents, supra note 68, at 815.
70. Id. at 820.
71. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional
Investor as CorporateMonitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1281 (1991).
72. Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)Significance of Institutional
ShareholderActivism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 488 (1991).
73. Id. at 473-74.
74. Id. at 474.

WAKE FOREST LAWREVIEW

688

[Vol. 48

suspects, labor union and public employee pension trusts, only a
subgroup of those (such as CALPERS) would have an interest in the
shareholder activism strategy suggested. Many, perhaps most,
union and public employee pension trust managers' sole or primary
concern would be investment performance, not improvements in or
fine tuning of corporate governance at portfolio companies.
Nonetheless, other corporate governance gurus hopped on the
bandwagon, publishing views about the ins and outs of shareholder
activism.7 5 At least they did so until the leading players in the band
put down their instruments, preparatory to taking up an entirely
new tune.7 6
IX. THE SHIFT TO AN EMPHASIS ON "GLOBAL" CONVERGENCE IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

One observation that can be made about self-styled corporate
governance advocates in the United States is that they never let the
grass grow under their feet. In fact, they do not even permit the
fescue, or whatever, to take root. Thus, in the second half of the
1990s, the governance prognosticators did an abrupt about-face,
abandoning talk about the prospect of institutional shareholder
activism in favor of pontification on the prospect of global
convergence.
The thesis went something like this. Through the process of
globalization the world had become a much smaller place. Through
use of media such as email and the Internet, governance advocates
in Singapore now knew, or knew how to find out, what was
happening on the corporate governance front in the United Kingdom
and the United States. The law or business school professor in
Canada was abreast equally on what had occurred in New Zealand
or in France. In fact, through the ease of international jet travel,
the bloke in New Zealand or his counterpart in Australia might even
have met the professor from Canada or the colleague from France,
either in one or the other's home country or at a conference at
which both had been in attendance.
Through these and other interactions, a consensus would
develop and a collection would emerge of what governance practices
The world of
were acceptable practices or best practices.

75. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium
Papers:A Case Study of Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation,
38 ARiz. L. REV. 559, 559-61 (1996); James E. Heard, Institutional Investors:
Agents of Change, 2 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX L. F. 19, 21-26 (1997).
76. A few, of course, came to the dance late, albeit with an interesting
comparative view. See, e.g., Bruce E. Aronson, A Japanese Calpers or a New
Model for Institutional Investor Activism? Japan's Pension Fund Association
and the Emergence of ShareholderActivism in Japan,7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 571,

571-73 (2011).
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governments, bar associations, accountancy professionals, and
larger corporations would pressure the legislatures and parliaments
to enact laws in order to be compliant with international best
practices standards. Influential international organizations such as
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund ("IMF"),
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"),
or Asian Development Bank would ratchet up the pressure. Why?
The enactment of user-friendly, modern economic laws and
compliance with "best" governance practices would promote stability
and predictability, leading to increased direct foreign investment
and similar capital flows. The world would then become an even
smaller, more hospitable place.
Thus, the global consensus, together with the pressure to
comply with or adopt it, or at least its salient features, would fill the
vacuum created by the separation of ownership and control. Rather
than nationalization, authoritative pronouncements such as those
by the ALI, discrete governmental interventions, or increased
institutional activism, the primary push for improved or good
governance would be a global one.
So far, so good, at least in theory: the remaining question was
what would the global consensus, the core of best practices, look
like? Enter the U.S. governance academic, or at least the more
chauvinist ones. According to U.S. academics, the global model of
good governance would replicate the U.S. model of corporate
governance, of course. In one of the more arrogant pieces written,
law professors from Harvard and Yale posited "the end of history"
for corporate law.7 7 An international contest had quietly unfolded
and, according to the professors, the U.S. corporate governance
model had won, hands down.
"[W]e are witnessing rapid
convergence on the standard shareholder-oriented [US] model as a
normative view of corporate structure and governance. We should
also expect this normative convergence to produce substantial
convergence in the practices of corporate governance and in
corporate law."78
The seconders found this to be a "strong convergence position,"
which was "boldly argue[d]."79 Corporations the world over would
conform to the U.S. model of two-fisted independent directors,
willing and able to remove underperforming CEOs.
Boards,
comprised of a majority of such independent directors, would
supervise and govern through an advanced committee arrangement.
Ruggedly independent shareholders would file derivative and class
77. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
CorporateLaw, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001).
78. Id. at 443.
79. CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6-7 (Jeffrey
N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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actions to vindicate management shortfalls and other imbroglios.
Takeover players would turn bidder if target managers and their
boards allowed share prices to languish, seizing control and ousting
the underperforming management.
The talisman for convergence advocates was efficiency. The
"fundamental force is efficiency. If there is one efficient corporate
governance mechanism, competitive pressures push firms around
the world toward that structure."80
Of course, cultural and political forces, which differ greatly from
region to region and even country to country, will always act as
culverts that shoot economies and political systems off in different
directions. Corporate governance in the Muslim world will not
always succumb to the lure of efficiency. Among Pacific Rim
countries, the Chinese dominate the economic sphere: extended
familial and social considerations rather than efficiency are
uppermost. The European psyche and attitude toward governance
is not congruent with the American one. The elite and high-handed
U.S. reformers never acknowledged these cultural differences
between regions and nation-states or blithely ignored them.
Instead, once more, the reformers side-stepped, moving onto the
next new theory they had concocted.
X. SHIFT OF THE EMPHASIS TO THE GATEKEEPERS

Enron imploded in the second half of 2001, entering bankruptcy
in December.8 1 WorldCom unraveled in Spring 2002, entering
bankruptcy in July.82 An A to Z list of corporate debacles took place,
putting paid to the notion that U.S. corporate governance had
achieved a near perfect or even advanced state, as The End of
History for Corporate Law had postulated. 83 Whatever the U.S.
system was, it had a great many defects and it did not do the job for
which it had been devised. In addition, of course, no sign existed
that the predicted convergence had taken place. 84
Given that glaring failure, corporate governance advocates
seemingly would have modified or retracted their convergence
hypothesis. They did not. Indeed, they took no notice whatsoever of
any naysayer or critic. Without batting an eye, they simply shifted

80. Id. at 27.
81. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a
Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at 1.
82. See Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy;
Largest U.S. Case: $107 Billion Collapse Isn't Likely to Disrupt Service, for Now,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at Al.
83. Id.; see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance? What a Difference 10 Years Make, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 365-66 (Thomas Clark & Douglas Branson eds., 2012).
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course yet again. One commentator summed up the new direction
for governance reform with the infelicitous title, "It's About the
Gatekeepers, Stupid!' 5
That author, Professor John Coffee, defines gatekeepers as
"reputational intermediaries who provide verification and
certification services to investors."86 I would define gatekeepers as a
subset of monitors of corporate operations and behavior, namely,
those "monitors who supply essential verification and certification
services to corporations."87 Either way, the new thing was to
strengthen gatekeepers or put them back in the positions they
perhaps once occupied so that newly energized and empowered
gatekeepers would fill the vacuum created by the separation of
ownership and control. One can count a number of monitors who
perform essential services for each corporation with whom they have
contact: audit committees, independent directors, auditors, debt
rating agencies, state and federal securities regulators (including
the SEC), and more specialized state and federal agencies (in
insurance, banking, energy production, and so on).
One can also count a number of other monitors who often do not
rise to the level of gatekeepers: financial analysts, members of the
financial press, and relational investors (institutions and other
investors who have large holdings).
"Having analysts and
institutions interested in your corporation can be very nice, but it is
not essential."8 8 One corporate governance piece counted no fewer
than thirteen types of entities that monitor corporate performance,
several of which rise to the level of gatekeepers.8 9
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX")90 heads off in varying
directions, but a careful reader can discern that one of the
legislation's dominant themes is strengthening gatekeepers as a
means of enhancing watchfulness over corporations. Thus, for
example, SOX requires public corporations to have audit committees
composed of independent directors, one or more of whom must be
85. John C. Coffee, Jr., UnderstandingEnron: "It's About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid," 57 Bus. LAw. 1403 (2002) [hereinafter Understanding Enron]; see
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failureand Reform: The Challenge of
FashioningRelevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293
(2003).
86. UnderstandingEnron, supranote 85, at 1405.
87. Douglas M. Branson, Enron-When All Systems Fail: Creative
Destruction or Roadmap to CorporateGovernanceReform?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989,
996 (2003).
88. Id. at 996.
89. See Douglas M. Branson, Too Many Bells? Too Many Whistles?
Corporate Governance in the Post-Enron, Post-WorldCom Era, 58 S.C. L. REV.
65, 67 (2006).
90. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.).
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financial experts.91 Section 307 imposes whistleblowing duties upon
attorneys who uncover wrongdoing. 92
To enhance their
independence, SOX requires that accounting firms that audit public
companies may no longer provide a long list of lucrative consulting
services for audit clients. 93
XI. EMPHASIS ON INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND INDEPENDENT
BOARD COMMITTEES

The tea leaves may still be swirling in the bottom of the cup and
thus impossible to read clearly, but the newest "new thing" in the
second half decade of the new century may be the independent
director movement. An independent director, of course, is one who
is free of material financial, or familial contacts with the corporation
or its senior managers. 94 The archetypical non-independent would
be a director who is also an insider, most often from having a
contractual or employment relationship with the company. Nonindependents would also include "gray insiders," such as the
attorney, investment banker, or other professional who also serves
on the board.
The emphasis on strengthening gatekeepers seems to have
faded from the scene stage left almost as quickly as it entered the
scene stage right.
It is true that the emphasis on independent directors began
much earlier with the earliest drafts of the ALI Project, but those
early drafts, which seem ho-hum today, were controversial. They
were so controversial that the ALI downgraded its prescriptions
from being a "Principle of Corporate Governance" to being one of the
"Recommendations of Corporate Practice Concerning the Board,"
assigning those recommendations to a special subsection of the final
draft, as it appeared in 1994.95
The ALI Principles recommend (but do not require) that "[t]he
board of every large publicly held corporation ... should have a
majority of directors who are free of any significant
relationship . . . with the corporation's senior executives." 96 Smaller
91. Id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 775-77.
92. Id. § 307, 116 Stat. at 784.
93. Id. § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 771-72 (detailing requirements for auditor
independence).
94. The ALI approaches this subject by means of a lengthy description of
those bright line relationships with senior executives which are disabling, such
as employment or receipt by the director or her firm of more than $200,000 per
year. See generally 1 AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 1.34 (including a two page
definition of "significant relationship").
95. See 1 AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, §§ 3A.01-.05.
A large publicly held
96. Id. § 3A.01(a) (cross references omitted).
corporation "means a corporation that as of the record date for its most recent
annual shareholders' meeting had both 2,000 or more record holders [§1.32] of
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publicly held corporations "should have at least three directors who
are free of any significant relationship with the corporation's senior
executives." 97
The movement for independent directors gathered steam with
the 2002 SOX legislation, which required that SEC reporting
companies, that is, most publicly held corporations, have an audit
committee comprised exclusively of independent directors.98 The
New York Stock Exchange followed by amending its Listing Manual,
which listed public companies that have a majority of directors who
are independent, 99 making the 1994 ALI recommendation for good
practice into a hard-and-fast requirement. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank
Act 00 jumped on the independent director bandwagon with its
requirement that exchanges refuse to list the shares of corporations
who disclose that they do not have a compensation committee
comprised of independent directors. 10 1 Observers who have written
about the issue assume that the Dodd-Frank disclosure requirement
is a de facto requirement that corporations have compensation
committees, albeit a backhanded sort of requirement. 102
The movement toward a majority, or indeed a supermajority, of
independent directors may be a reform which leads nowhere, all for
naught, as all the previously suggested reforms have, if Professor
Myles Mace's thesis continues to hold true. 103 Even though they
may be independent, "directors who do not direct" (the title of
Professor Mace's examination of directors) and very often merely
rubberstamp the express or implied wishes of senior management do
little to improve governance. 104 Thus, the predilection of corporate
America to name the same individuals over and over again to

its equity securities [§ 1.20] and $100 million or more of total assets [§ 1.37]."

Id. § 1.24.

97. Id. § 3.A.01(b).
98. SOX § 301, 116 Stat. at 775-77.
99. § 303A.01: Independent Directors, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
(Nov. 25, 2009), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp
?selectednode=chp_1_4&manual=%2Fcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F
("Listed companies must have a majority of independent directors."). Listing
Manual § 303A.02 contains a lengthy definition of independence.
100. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
101. Id. § 952, 124 Stat. at 1900-03.

102. See, e.g., Mark A. Borges, The Executive Compensation Provisionsof the
Dodd-FrankAct, 44 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIEs REG. 1, 11-13 (2011).

103. MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 106-09, 184-90, 206
(1971).
104. See William 0. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1305, 1322-23, 1330 (1934) (arguing that there needs to be a solution to the
problem of directors whose decisions do not serve or represent the needs of the
shareholders).
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various corporations' boards results in a cadre of "trophy
directors,"10 5 who may be independent but are, at most, totems, as
opposed to effective, hands-on directors. A 2007 census of the U.S.
Fortune 500's boards revealed that the fastest growing segment of
women directors has been trophy directors, those holding four or
more directorships.10 6 The number rose dramatically, from thirty in
2001 to seventy-nine in 2005.107 In this day and age, no person, man
or woman, can function properly on more than two or perhaps three
publicly held corporations' boards of directors. So again, reformers
push for another governance reform that has little, if any, chance of
improving the governance of publicly held corporations.
CONCLUSION

Again, in refrain of a question first raised in the introduction,
"Why is this so?" Why does reform proposal after reform proposal
end up effectively going nowhere? One tentative observation is that
all, or most all, of these proposals come from the top down rather
than the bottom up. Second, the proposals come from an alarmingly
small circle of academics, all of whom hang their hats at elite
academic institutions and talk largely with only one another. The
result is inbreeding and disconnect from the real world.
In turn, the disconnect results in promulgation of governance
reform proposals that are less than fully responsive to what the real
world problems may be, such as federal chartering, institutional
investor activism, gatekeeper enhancement, and so on. Third, in
some cases, such as in the postulation of "global convergence" in
corporate governance,10 the reform proposals result in downright
scorn, at least in foreign lands.10 9 Fourth, when proposals are made
from the bottom up, as for instance, the women's organizations'
105. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, No SEAT AT THE TABLE: How CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 89 (2007); Judith
H. Dobrzynski, When DirectorsPlay Musical Chairs:Seats on Too Many Boards
Spell Problemsfor Investors, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at Fl.
106. CATALYST, 2007 CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN BOARD DIRECTORS OF THE
FP500: VOICES FROM THE BOARDROOM 13-14 (2008).
107. BRANSON, supranote 105, at 97.
108. See, e.g., CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE LAW, supra note
79; but cf. Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global"
Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321, 323 (2001)
("Today the academy has become much enamored with the notion of 'global'
convergence in corporate governance. That is to say, in the opinion of a number

of the elites in the United States corporate law academy, the governance
structure and practices of larger corporations all over the world soon will take
on a resemblance one to another.").
109. Branson, supra note 84, at 365; see Cally Jordan, The Conundrum of
Corporate Governance, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 983, 985-88 (2005) (arguing that

the convergence theories that have been posited are more confusing than
anything and do not in fact answer the issues at hand).
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continued push for increased representation of women and other
minorities in senior management positions and governance, nary a
word will be written or otherwise uttered by those who control the
corporate governance reform agenda in this country. 110
A large portion of the blame may also lie with a near-universal
failure to rethink the problem or predicament with which corporate
governance reform proposals must deal. For six decades, the
question to be answered has been how to substitute for the lack of
accountability and control that results from the separation of
ownership and control as Berle and Means first hypothesized. A few
scholars have pointed out that the Berle and Means corporation,
with dispersed share ownership, may predominate only in the
United Kingdom, the United States, and perhaps a few other
developed nations. Instead, corporate governance in most other
countries of the world faces the challenge of dominant shareholder
capitalism, be it family capitalism, state-owned enterprise, or some
other form, rather than dispersed share ownership and the
separation of ownership and control.1 11 Nonetheless, the erstwhile
governance reformers press on as though the Berle and Means
corporation were universal.
The purpose of this symposium, titled as it is (Agency Theory:
Still Viable?), is to do exactly that, examine new ways of looking at

110. The growing impetus to place women on boards of directors and in
senior executive positions dates at least from the early 1990s and has "legs"

today. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Initiatives to Place Women on Corporate
Boards of Directors-A Global Snapshot, 37 J. CORP. L. 793, 802-13 (2012)
(describing several programs put forth in an attempt to increase women's
participation within corporations). The first woman chief executive officer took
office in 1997. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, THE LAST MALE BASTION: GENDER AND
THE CEO SUITE IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC COMPANIES 3-12 (2010) (describing Jill

Barad's role at Mattel, Inc.).

There are twenty-one female chief executive

officers in the Fortune 500 today. SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN-WOMEN, WORK,

AND WILL TO LEAD 5 (2013). The attention and publicity given to Sheryl
Sandberg's 2013 book, Lean In, has been nothing short of astounding. See, e.g.,
Belinda
Luscombe,
Confidence
Woman,
TIME
(March
2013),
http://ideas.time.com/2013/03/07/confidence-woman ("Don't Hate Her Because
She's Successful; Facebook's Sheryl Sandberg and Her Mission to Reboot
Feminism."). The push for increase in the pathways to and appointment of
more women and other minorities to corporate positions is, in this author's
opinion, a corporate reform push from the bottom up rather than from on high
(from the top down).

111.

See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins, CorporateLaw and Ownership Structure:A

Darwinian Link?, 25 U. NEW S. WALES L. J. 346, 353-54 (2002) ("[T]here are
limits on the extent to which share ownership dispersion will take place in
small countries."); id. at 367 (explaining that from the empirical evidence
reviewed, the U.S. and UK "are the two countries where the Berle-Means
corporation clearly dominates"); Cally Jordan, Family Resemblances: The

Family Controlled Company in Asia and Its Implications for Law Reform, 8
AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 89, 94 (1997).
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the situation. Led by Professor Michael Jensen of the Harvard
Business School, a group of distinguished scholars from the United
States and Europe will express their views on "thinking outside the
box." Although these efforts should have been undertaken twenty,
twenty-five, or even thirty years ago, better late than never.

